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Abstract
The paper proves that monopolistic price discrimination increases output under conditions of
constant demand elasticity. The demonstration is simpler than that of Formby, Layson and
Smith (1983)
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A well-known result in the theoretical literature on the welfare e⁄ects of third degree price
discrimination is that a move from uniform pricing to price discrimination reduces welfare
if total output decreases.1 So a focal point has been the analysis of the e⁄ects of price
discrimination on output. It is known at least from Robinson (1933) that in the case of
linear demands price discrimination does not change output (assuming that all markets
are served under both pricing regimes). In the general non-linear case, the e⁄ect of price
discrimination on output may be either positive or negative. Since Robinson (1933) a
great many papers have addressed this issue, including Leontief (1940), Edwards (1950),
Silberberg (1970), Greenhut and Ohta (1976), L￿fgren (1977), Smith and Formby (1981),
Schmalensee (1981), Shih, Mai and Liu (1988) and Cheung and Wang (1994), among
others. However, one of the most popular demand families, constant elasticity demands,
has proven particularly resistant to analysis. The criteria developed by the relevant
literature are unable to answer the question ¿does price discrimination always increase
total output under constant demand elasticity conditions?2 Formby, Layson and Smith
(1983) (FLS) using Lagrangean techniques, show that monopolistic price discrimination
increases total output over a wide range of constant elasticities. In this paper, I provide
a simpler proof by using the Bernoulli inequality.3
2 ANALYSIS
Consider a monopolist selling a good in n perfectly separated markets. The demand
function in market i (i = 1,..., n) has constant elasticity and is given by Di(pi) = aip
￿"i
i ,
where pi is the price charged in that market, "i is the constant elasticity (in absolute
value) of demand ("i > 1) and ai > 0. Marginal cost, c, is assumed constant.
Under price discrimination, the optimal policy for the monopolist is given by
1Schmalensee (1981) proves this conjecture assuming nonlinear demand curves, perfectly separated
markets and constant marginal cost. Varian (1985) extends the result by allowing imperfect arbitrage and
by allowing marginal cost to be constant or increasing. Using a revealed-preference argument, Schwartz
(1990) generalizes the result to the case in which marginal cost is decreasing.
2So, neither the "adjusted concavity" criterion (Robinson, 1933, Cheung and Wang, 1994) nor the
"slope ratio" criterion (Edwards, 1950), nor the "mean-value theorem" criterion (Shih, Mai and Liu,
1988), among others, serve to answer the question.
3Galera and Zaratiegui (2006) use the Bernoulli inequality to show that under duopoly an increase in
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where pd
i denotes the optimal price in market i. That is, the Lerner index (or price-
marginal cost ratio) in each market is inversely proportional to its elasticity of demand.
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and the monopolist, therefore, states a higher price in the market with the lower elasticity
of demand. The quantity sold in market i, qd
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Under simple monopoly pricing, pro￿ts are maximized by charging all consumers a






































2where the elasticity of market i is weighted by the "share" of that market at the optimal
uniform price, wi(p0) = Di(p0)=
n X
i=1
Di(p0). Denote as q0
i and q0 the quantity sold in
market i , q0




uniform pricing, respectively. Following FLS (1983) I assume that the units of production
























FLS (1983) address the question by using Lagrangean techniques. In particular they
minimize the di⁄erence between qd and q0 with respect to the sub-market elasticities
subject to the restriction that the changes must leave the elasticity of aggregate demand
(at the simple monopoly price) unchanged. Next, I shall use the Bernoulli inequality to
provide a simpler proof.
In order to prove that price discrimination increases total output, I use a generalization
for real exponents of the Bernoulli inequality which says that "if 0 6= x > ￿1 and
a > 1 are real values, then (1 + x)a > 1 + ax."4 It is useful to rewrite this inequality
as (y)a > 1 + a(y ￿ 1), where y = x + 1.
Note that as "i > 1 the Bernoulli inequality implies that
4See, for example, Mitrinovic (1970). The generalization for real exponents of Bernoulli inequality is
straightforward with the use of calculus. Consider the function f(x) = (1 + x)a ￿ (1 + ax). The ￿rst
derivative is given by f0(x) = a(1+x)a￿1 ￿a. Notice that if a > 1 then f
00
(x) = a(a￿1)(1+x)a￿2 > 0,

















































































































C C C C
A
. (13)
To complete the proof we have only to check that the last term in (13) is non-negative.




























































= 0 from the associative law of addition. So
qd > q0 and price discrimination therefore increases output.
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